Fundamentals of Vedanta Topic 3: The Nature of Knowledge and its Means

~ Satyan Chidambaran
  1. Introduction
  2. What is Knowledge?
  3. The Means of Knowledge
    1. The First Knowledge Principle
    2. The Second Knowledge Principle
    3. The Third Knowledge Principle
  4. The Means of Knowledge: The Six pramāṇas Accepted by Vedānta
    1. Perception (pratyakṣa)
    2. Inference (anumāna)
    3. Postulation (arthāpatti)
    4. Non-cognition (anupalabdhi)
    5. Comparison (upamāna)
    6. Words (śabda)
  5. Direct versus Indirect Knowledge
  6. Relevance of these Six pramāṇas for Self-Knowledge
  7. Enter Vedic Words (śabdas of the Vedas)
    1. Veda Pūrva
    2. Vedānta
  8. Conclusion

सदाशिवसमारम्भां शङ्कराचार्यमध्यमाम् ।

अस्मदाचार्य पर्यन्तां वन्दे गुरुपरम्पराम् ॥

sadāśivasamārambhāṃ śaṅkarācāryamadhyamām

asmadācāryaparyantāṃ vande guruparamparām

I salute the entire unbroken lineage of teachers (of ātmavidyā) starting with sadāśiva, with śaṅkarācārya in the middle, all the way up to my ācārya.

Introduction

In the last topic, we saw the futility of action and the indispensability of knowledge for accomplishing something that has already been accomplished. In the vision of Vedānta, the seeker of mokṣa is already limitless. His limitlessness, as Brahman, is already accomplished and just not known. Hence, to end his search, the seeker of mokṣa must remove the ignorance of his real nature. For that, Self-Knowledge is the only solution.

This raises a question: how does one know oneself as one already is? What means does one use to gain this knowledge of oneself?

To this effect, we will inquire into the nature of knowledge and the means of knowledge available and then examine which of these means can lead one to Self-Knowledge.

What is Knowledge?

According to Vedānta, knowledge, in general, is a modification in the mind of a knower that reveals an object1. The term knowledge in a broad sense may either be invalid or valid. Vedānta uses the term pramā for valid knowledge. pramā, or valid knowledge, according to Vedānta, is that knowledge whose content is not previously known (anadhigatam) and not negated (abādhitam)2 3 4. Invalid knowledge (such as seeing a snake instead of a rope), on the other hand, is called apramā (or bhramaḥ)5 as it is negated later (by rope knowledge). If an already known fact is recalled, e.g., If I recall “fire is hot”, then as it is a fact that is already known to me previously, it is not considered as pramā because of the inclusion of novelty (anadhigatam) as a criterion for the focus here is on the means that give rise to new knowledge and recollection can never, in itself, be a means for gaining new knowledge.

The knower is called pramāta. The object to be known is called prameya. Valid knowledge (pramā) is just a discovery of what is (prameya). Its function is to reveal what is. Unlike action, it doesn’t alter the object or create anything new. The rise of knowledge doesn’t bring about any other change. The only “change” it brings about is a modification (pramā) in the mind of the knower (pramāta) that removes ignorance of that which is to be known (prameya).

The Means of Knowledge

The unique cause (or means or instrument) for the rise of pramā is called pramāṇam6. Eyes, for example, are called pramāṇam for knowing colors as they are the unique means of knowledge of colors. No other sense organ can provide us with the knowledge of color. Even though the mind is also involved in the cognition of color, it is not a unique cause for the rise of color knowledge, for the mind is involved in all cognitions. Hence, only the eyes are considered the pramāṇam for the rise of color knowledge as they are the special or unique cause. Similarly, only the ears are the pramāṇam for knowing sounds.

Now, we can see that there are four factors in any cognition: pramāta (the knower), pramāṇam (the means of knowledge), prameya (the object to be known), and pramā (the knowledge itself).

For the rest of this note, when we use “knowledge”, we mean valid knowledge or pramā. We will use the adjectives invalid or valid in conjunction with knowledge to be more explicit when the context requires it.

When we need to gain knowledge of the color of an object (say an apple), all we do is open our eyes and align them with the object. When the eyes come in “contact” with the desired object, knowledge of its color takes place.  There is no separate action or will required. This is a critical observation and can be extended to any knowledge. Thus, based on this, we formulate the following Principles.

The First Knowledge Principle

When an appropriate and adequate means of knowledge (pramāṇam) is aligned with an object (prameya),knowledge (pramā) takes place in the knower (pramāta).

Note the qualifications appropriate and adequate. The means employed to gain the knowledge must be appropriate, considering the object whose knowledge needs to be gained. Returning to our example, if we need to gain knowledge of color and insist on using our ears, knowledge of colors will remain elusive.

Also, the means of knowledge employed must be adequate, meaning they must be free of defects and without obstructions. If my eyes are cataracted, or the lighting isn’t enough, and I try to employ the eyes to gain knowledge of color, I may not see the color as it is.  If some erroneous or doubtful knowledge is gained, it would only be because of some such obstruction. If those unfavorable conditions are removed and the eyes are employed again, then valid knowledge will take place.

Corollary to the First Knowledge Principle:

Valid knowledge cannot take place without employing an appropriate and adequate pramāṇam.

Thus, I cannot insist that I want to know the color of the fruit in front of me without using my eyes. I cannot use my free will to generate knowledge without utilizing a means of knowledge.

The Second Knowledge Principle

When an appropriate and adequate means of knowledge (pramāṇam) is aligned with an object (prameya), the knowledge (pramā) that takes place cannot be willed to be any different. 

The knowledge that takes place (by employing a means of knowledge) is not dependent on the will of the knower (pramāta), but it is dependent on the object (prameya). This is also briefly stated as “Knowledge is not puruṣatantram7, but it is vastutantram”. Action is puruṣatantram for action depends on the will of the actor. One may act, one may not act, or one may act differently. There are multiple options for going from San Francisco to LA. One may take a car, one may go by flight or by train, or one may not go at all. One can choose as one wills. 

With knowledge, on the other hand, there is no choice with regard to the form it takes8 9. If the conditions for knowledge to take place are met, it takes the form of its object. Thus, there is a two-fold denial of choice: one cannot choose whether knowledge takes place (The First Knowledge Principle), and one cannot choose the type of knowledge that takes place (The Second Knowledge Principle).

Due to these Principles, we pick up the smell of garbage when the garbage truck is nearby. The object, the means of knowledge (the sense of smell), and the knower are all there without obstructions. Knowledge must take place, and I have no choice regarding its content. I cannot “will” it to be otherwise. My only choice when I find the stink overpowering is to close the nostrils with my fingers and create an obstruction.

The Third Knowledge Principle

Every means of knowledge (pramāṇam) has inherent validity, reliability, or trustworthiness. 

When my eyes show that the color of the apple in front of me is red, I take it for a fact. I do not question the validity of what I see. I do not await further confirmation from some other source. Why? Most people do not bother inquiring into this. If we inquire, we will understand that we take what the eyes reveal as a fact because the eyes, being a means of knowledge (pramāṇam), have inherent self-validity in their sphere. Just as fire is inherently hot, a pramāṇam is inherently self-valid.

This property of the inherent self-validity of every pramāṇam is called svataḥprāmāṇyam10.

The validity of knowledge that is produced (by the application of an appropriate and adequate means of knowledge) is inherent in the knowledge that is produced. The same defect-free causes that come together to produce the knowledge also ensure that the knowledge generated is valid and is also cognized as valid11. 

Suppose the knowledge is found to be invalid, as in the case of the rope seen as a snake; the invalidity of knowledge is due to some extrinsic obstruction or defect in the causes. e.g., poor light, etc. If those defects are removed, valid knowledge will take place. Thus, if the generation of knowledge is invalid, it is only due to some defect in the causes.  Cognition of invalidity of knowledge also arises from some external fruitless pursuit based on the invalid knowledge, such as the pursuit of silver where there is really a shell12. The futility of such a pursuit will make one infer that the original knowledge was invalid. 

Thus, both generation and cognition of invalidity of knowledge are a result of extrinsic causes, whereas both generation and cognition of validity are intrinsic to the causes of cognition.

If pramāṇas are not inherently self-valid, then what one pramāṇa reveals needs to be confirmed by another pramāṇa. The second pramāṇa also would then need further confirmation from a third pramāṇa and so on, ad infinitum. Then, there can be no finality in knowledge at all.

If the eyes aren’t self-valid means for the knowledge of colors, we would need to look for a confirmation of the color from some other means of knowledge, and we will never get that confirmation as no other means of knowledge operates in the sphere of color knowledge. We would constantly be in doubt. Therefore, the only way to gain knowledge of color is to use the eyes, ensure no defects or obstructions, and know that the knowledge we get from there is valid. This knowledge one has that a means of knowledge has to be self-valid in its own sphere (with an undisputed status in its own sphere) is called śraddhā13.

Without śraddhā in what our eyes reveal, we cannot even place the next foot forward on the floor ahead as we would await confirmation from some other source as to whether the floor my eyes reveal is really there! This points to the fact that I implicitly have śraddhā in what my eyes reveal, even if I don’t acknowledge it explicitly. Even a scientist cannot operate unless he has śraddhā that the star or galaxy that his eye reveals (as being there) is, in fact, there. The fact that a scientist has śraddhā in what his eyes reveal is generally neither explicitly stated nor explicitly understood in that manner but casually taken for granted without any inquiry.

With this background, let us examine all the different pramāṇas available to humans for gaining knowledge.

The Means of Knowledge: The Six pramāṇas Accepted by Vedānta

Vedānta does a thorough analysis of all available means of knowledge and acknowledges the availability of six means of knowledge14:

  1. pratyakṣa (perception)
  2. anumāna (inference)
  3. arthāpatti (postulation)
  4. anupalabdhi (non-cognition)
  5. upamāna (comparison)
  6. śabda (words)

We will look at what each of these are.

Perception (pratyakṣa)

pratyakṣa, or perception, is a means of knowledge. Knowledge of sounds, touch, color, taste, and smell comes under pratyakṣa pramāṇam. Corresponding to each of these, the means of knowledge are the sense organs of hearing (ears), touching (skin), seeing (eyes), tasting (tongue), and smelling (nose). According to Advaita, the actual pramāṇas that get engaged when the outer organs are operated are the corresponding sense organs of knowledge (jñānendriyas) that reside in the mind. When the jñānendriya comes in contact with the sense object, it takes the form of the sense object. This results in direct and immediate knowledge.

pratyakṣa stands tall amongst all pramāṇas. Most of our daily transactions rely solely on pratyakṣa. pratyakṣa is a collection of five different pramāṇas with the common property that direct and immediate knowledge takes place when any of the five sense organs comes in contact with its corresponding object. This implies that the object has to be within range of the sense organs without any obstruction to be grasped by them. I cannot use pratyakṣa pramāṇam to gain knowledge of Mount Everest when I am far away in Chennai. There is no way my senses can contact Mount Everest. On the other hand, if I were in Nepal near Everest, I could use pratyakṣa pramāṇam to know what Everest looks like and how much snow it has.

One point to note here is that the organs of taste, smell, and touch require the sense object to contact the sense organ physically. With taste and touch, this is quite evident. With the sense of smell, it is less noticeable, but tiny particles of the substance have to travel to the nose for the sense of smell to reveal the scent. On the other hand, the senses of sight and hearing reveal the colors and sounds, respectively, even if the objects are physically separated from the organ. Another point to note is that, unlike the other sense organs, the sense of touch pervades the entire outer body. Hence, anything that crawls on my body or touches me anywhere is immediately known. Of course, nails and hair (thankfully) do not have the sense of touch pervading them, or we wouldn’t ever cut them.

The progress of science over centuries can be attributed mainly to pratyakṣa. Science is all about observation, creating a hypothesis or model, making a prediction, validating the hypothesis, and revising the hypothesis as needed. The first and fourth phases in this, i.e., the observation and validation, are generally based on pratyakṣa pramāṇam. With newer and newer “scopes” (microscope, telescope, stethoscope, etc.) that extend the range of our sense organs, we can make newer observations both at the micro level and the macro level to formulate new theories or revise old ones. Hence, progress in science depends critically on pratyakṣa pramāṇam.

The thoughts and feelings that I have in my mind are also known to me. Even though none of my sense organs are involved, the knowledge is direct and immediate. Hence, it is similar to the perceptual knowledge that arises when the sense organs are involved. Thus, this direct seeing of thoughts and feelings is called witness perception (or sākṣīpratyakṣa).

Inference (anumāna)

When I see one entity but deduce the presence of a second entity that I don’t see directly, it is inference or anumāna in action. I see billowing smoke on the hill and conclude that there is fire. The fire is not directly seen; only the smoke is.

I can reliably apply anumāna only if I know of an invariable relation between the observed entity and the inferred entity. The relationship is called invariable concomitance (vyāpti). For example, “Wherever there is smoke, there is fire” is an example of vyāpti. To be able to use anumāna, one should have grasped the vyāpti through generalization from one or more observations of a phenomenon earlier where the two entities were seen to co-exist. Then, if one observes smoke on a distant hill, one can infer that there is fire as follows: “The mountain has fire; because it has smoke; wherever there is smoke, there is fire as observed in the case of a hearth”.15

We use anumāna pramāṇam in our daily lives every day. An example of anumāna I use anytime I walk on the road is: “There is a vehicle behind; because I hear a horn sound from behind; wherever there is a horn sound from behind, there is a vehicle behind as observed in case of prior horn sounds heard from behind”. I don’t see the vehicle, but I know that there is a vehicle and shift to the side to let it pass. “There is someone at the door; because I hear the doorbell ring; whenever the doorbell rings, there is someone at the door, as observed in the case of prior doorbell rings” is also anumāna. Interestingly, if it were not for anumāna, I wouldn’t proceed towards food when I am hungry because the attribute resident in food to quench hunger is not directly perceived by pratyakṣa pramāṇam! It is inferred. The inference works as follows: “This food has the attribute of quenching hunger; because of being food; wherever there is food, there is the attribute of quenching hunger as observed in the case of prior (eaten) food”.16

Science again relies heavily on anumāna to expand the boundaries of scientific knowledge. If science were to restrict itself to pratyakṣa, there would be many things that we wouldn’t know. Looking at the spectrum of emitted light from stars, I can tell what elements make up its core. This is again anumāna. Looking at the presence of a tumor marker in the blood report, a doctor knows that there is a tumor growing in the body. Again anumāna.

anumāna is an extremely powerful pramāṇam with wide applicability that allows us to infer things we cannot see directly. However, it is subservient to pratyakṣa because it can be applied only in cases where the first factor is available via pratyakṣa.

Postulation (arthāpatti)

When two mutually contradictory facts are observed, they can only be explained if there is a third fact. Reasoning of this type is called arthāpatti. 

A common example is that a man is known to fast during the day. However, he gains weight. The only explanation for this is that he must be eating at night. No one sees him eat at night, for he does it in hiding. Hence, the knowledge that he eats at night is not pratyakṣa. It is also not accepted as being a form of anumāna. This type of reasoning is arthāpatti and is treated as a separate pramāṇam.

Non-cognition (anupalabdhi)

I know when something is not there. I see that there is no money in my wallet, and I know that there is no money in my wallet. I know that “there is no money” is not pratyakṣa, for in pratyakṣa, sense organs need to contact an existent object. They cannot contact a non-existent object. Thus, knowing that there is no money in my wallet is attributed to a special pramāṇam called non-cognition or anupalabdhi. In fact, any non-existence can only be known because of anupalabdhi pramāṇam.

Comparison (upamāna)

When one goes to the forest and sees a wild cow, one sees its resemblance to the cow at home. But then, one also gains the knowledge that the cow at home is similar to the wild cow. At that point, one doesn’t see the cow at home but gains knowledge about its similarity to the wild cow. Thus, it is not pratyakṣa, but this knowledge is said to be gained by a different pramāṇam called upamāna.17

Words (śabda)

Words from a reliable source, called śabda pramāṇam, give rise to valid knowledge, and hence, they are treated as a separate means.

A lot of science that we learn comes to us not from pratyakṣa but by employing śabda pramāṇam. The original scientists may have used pratyakṣa, but we learn about the discoveries from śabda in our science books. We haven’t seen that the earth is spherical, nor have we seen it rotate on its axis, but we still know about these from śabdas.

So much else in our day-to-day transactional life depends on the knowledge we gain from śabdas. When I read in the newspaper about events in the city, that is again śabda. Based on that knowledge, I make plans and book tickets for the show, etc. 

The minimum unit of śabda pramāṇam is a sentence. By understanding the meanings of the words and their relationships in a sentence, I can gain knowledge about things that other pramāṇas cannot reveal. Some things are known to us exclusively by śabda only. For example, if we want to know what the other person is thinking, or about the dream of another person, or know where in their body he is experiencing pain, we have to ask and solely rely on his śabdas to know.

These are classified as laukika śabdas or means of knowledge based on worldly words.

Direct versus Indirect Knowledge

Of the six pramāṇas discussed, the knowledge that rises due to pratyakṣa and anupalabdhi is direct because the object, or its lack thereof, is apprehended directly. This is called aparokṣa jñānam or Direct Knowledge. 

With anumāna, arthāpatti, and upamāna, the knowledge of the object concerned is indirect. For example, the inferred fire is not directly contacted by the senses. I know the existence of fire. But the fire is not illuminated directly by the senses. Such indirect knowledge is called parokṣa jñānam.

It is worthwhile noting here that śabda pramāṇam may result in direct (aparokṣa) or indirect (parokṣa) knowledge. When the entity that the śabdas describe is remote, it results in parokṣa jñānam or indirect knowledge. For example, a friend who has visited the Valley of Flowers in the Himalayas may describe his experiences there in great detail. For me, the listener, it would result in parokṣa jñānam (indirect knowledge) of the Valley of Flowers that has to be converted to aparokṣa jñānam (direct knowledge) later by actually visiting that place. 

However, in some instances, especially when the end is already accomplished and just not known, as in the case of the tenth man’s search for the tenth man, śabda pramāṇam produces aparokṣa jñānam (direct knowledge) as we have already seen.

Relevance of these Six pramāṇas for Self-Knowledge

Having examined all the six pramāṇas, let us now try to apply them for Self-Knowledge. I need to know who/what I really am. Which of these pramāṇas can I use? 

The knower (pramāta) is the one who uses all the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) to gain knowledge (pramā) of various objects (prameyas). How can the knower know the real nature of the knower, the subject, using such means of knowledge that the knower uses to know the known objects? The knower (subject) is never a known (object).

Can I hear the knower of sounds? Can I touch the knower of touches? Can I see the knower of colors? Can I taste the knower of tastes? Can I smell the knower of smells? Our eyes cannot even see themselves, much less can they see the mind; what then to talk of seeing the knower of all these? The absurdity of using pratyakṣa for knowing the one employing pratyakṣa should be very evident.

How about sākṣī pratyakṣa pramāṇam, which is the means for knowing the thoughts and feelings? Thoughts and feelings are undoubtedly very subtle, but they are still intimate objects perceived by me. Hence, they are knowable. However, the means, sākṣī pratyakṣa, by which I know the thoughts and feelings can never reveal who I, their perceiver, am.

How about Inference (anumāna)? As we saw, inference can deduce a second entity only when a first entity is observed. The knower is the one employing inference. One cannot observe anything about the knower, based on which one can infer something else about the knower.

Postulation (arthāpatti) and Comparison (upamāna) are also out of the door as they don’t tell us anything about the knower, for both are based on pratyakṣa. Non-cognition (anupalabdhi) is again not applicable as it tells us about non-existent things, but the knower exists.

The entire human-originated śabda pramāṇam that we have access to are words spoken or written by humans. Those śabdas are called laukika śabda pramāṇam. As long as such human-originated words talk about objects that can be known, that can constitute a means of knowledge to the reader or listener for knowing those same known objects. However, if the śabdas of a human claim to throw light on the knower, that would beg the question as to how any human could have come to know about the knower in the first place using the usual pramāṇas available to the humans that we have already enumerated and dismissed as being incapable of knowing the knower.

Hence, all these pramāṇas (together called laukika pramāṇas or worldly means of knowledge) are ruled out for knowing the real nature of the knower. Does that mean that it is impossible for me to know who I am using these pramāṇas? And if it is impossible for me to know my real nature using any of these pramāṇas, does that mean that my mokṣa, which depends on me knowing my limitless Brahman nature, is impossible?

Yes, it is impossible for me to know who I am using any of these laukika pramāṇas. But, thankfully, I can still know my real nature using another unique śabda pramāṇa that cannot be counted amongst these laukika paramāṇas, and it is solely because of this pramāṇa that Self-Knowledge and mokṣa are possible.

Enter Vedic Words (śabdas of the Vedas)

The tradition presents the Vedas as a śabda pramāṇa that does not have a human origin. They are hence called apauruṣēya. What does that mean? There is no human author for the Vedas. The R̥ṣis are said to have just discovered them. Just as the five elements exist in nature, the sounds of the Vedas also exist in nature. These sounds have just been discovered by r̥ṣis18, and then the sounds have propagated from generation to generation. 

The Vedas also say that when the creation emerges from Brahman, the five elements emerge from Brahman, and the sun, moon, stars, etc., similar to the prior cycle of creation emerge from Brahman. Similarly, the Vedas that are similar to the Vedas from the previous cycle of creation emerge from Brahman. The Vedas inform us that the creation cycles don’t have a beginning. There have been infinite creation and dissolution cycles before this one. Brahman has been there eternally. As the Vedas that emerge in any creation are similar to the ones in the prior creations, the Vedas are not created. Hence, the Vedas are also beginningless. The Vedas have always existed in Brahman.

The Vedas present themselves as the pramāṇa for the knowledge of both dharma and Brahman. The Vedas contain knowledge regarding dharma and Brahman that is impossible for human beings to gain otherwise by employing laukika pramāṇas. Sāyaṇācārya defines the Veda thus in his commentary on the Vedas:

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमित्या वा यस्तूपायो न बुद्ध्यते ।

एनम् विदन्ति वेदेन तस्मात् वेदस्य वेदता ॥ 

pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yastūpāyo na buddhyate.  

enam vidanti vedena tasmāt vedasya vedatā.

That (the whole gamut of means, ends, truths), which is unknowable through pratyakṣa and anumāna, is known through the Veda. Therefore, the Veda is the Veda. 

                                                Kṛṣṇa Yajur Veda Taittirīya Saṃhitā Bhāṣya Introduction

The Vedas also tell us about means and ends for accomplishing all the four puruṣārthas that cannot be otherwise known with laukika pramāṇas. 

Being apauruṣēya, the Vedas are considered by the tradition to be faultless. Human creations can and do have faults due to limitations and defects of the human intellect and limitations of the laukika pramāṇas, the only available means of knowledge for a human. As the Vedas are not a product of the limited human minds, they are said to be faultless.

There are two parts to the Vedas: Veda Pūrva and Vedānta.

Veda Pūrva

This is the first part of the Vedas. It is also called karmakāṇḍa. It contains karmas that one can perform to attain certain ends related to artha, kāma, and dharma puruṣārthas. Of course, one can try to achieve artha and kāma goals without the help of the Veda. However, the Veda provides efficacious karmas that help accomplish these puruṣārthas and even other artha, kāma goals that the human mind may never know about otherwise. 

The Veda Pūrva, being a pramāṇa for dharma, tells us about the existence of puṇyam and pāpam, which are adṛṣṭam (not known by any other pramāṇa). The Veda Pūrva also tells us that actions that go against dharma accrue pāpam, whereas actions in keeping with dharma accrue puṇyam. In effect, we know about the Law of Karma only from Veda pramāṇa.The Veda Pūrva tells us about the transmigrating jīva and its travel to other lokas (worlds) after death, and it also tells us about the existence of seven upper lokas (worlds) and seven lower lokas. It also tells us about svarga and naraka.

A scientist who knows the limits of science (which is only based on laukika pramāṇas) will also know that he has no arguments to disprove what the Veda says. How can science disprove rebirth? That the transmigrating sūkṣma śarīra (subtle body) exists is also known only from the Veda. No one has seen it, nor can science ever see it with all the scopes that are there or are yet to come. Being subtle, it is outside the scope of laukika pramāṇas. If anyone insists that there is no rebirth, it is their own belief they are welcome to hold, but the critical thing to note is that anyone subscribing to this view has no proof for what they believe either. But the people who argue that there is no rebirth seem to want to place the burden of proof on those who say rebirth is there. The point they miss is that rebirth cannot be proved because all proving and demonstration is in the scope of the spheres of pratyakṣa and anumāna, but that which is purely in the sphere of Veda pramāṇa cannot be either confirmed or contradicted by another pramāṇa just as the color that my eyes reveal cannot either be proved or contradicted by another pramāṇa.

On the other hand, if we give the Veda the benefit of doubt, many otherwise unexplained things start to make sense. By accepting the possibility of rebirth and karma, it becomes possible to explain disparities at birth as to why some children face extreme hardship, whereas others are born with silver spoons in their mouths.

“What I don’t see doesn’t exist, what I cannot prove doesn’t exist” is a naïve approach and arguably irrational. The absence of (sensory) evidence doesn’t necessarily mean evidence of absence. Even a truly rational person who uses pure reason should be able to acknowledge the possibilities of things that could exist and be true that are simply outside the reach of reason19. 

For someone who understands how a pramāṇa works, the only way to know things that lie beyond human means of knowledge is to acknowledge the helplessness of the human means of knowledge and know them as the Veda reveals. This knowledge about the undisputed validity of the Veda in its own sphere that doesn’t need confirmation from any other source is called śraddhā.

Veda Pūrva is in the form of injunctions and prohibitions. It is also a description of means and ends. Thus, the essence of Veda Pūrva is karma. One gains knowledge of the karma to perform, and then one needs to perform that karma if one is interested in the desired end it is said to achieve. The Veda Pūrva talks of the following types of karmas:

  1. Nitya karmas: compulsory karmas such as trikāla sandhyāvandanam (performance of sandhyāvandanam three times a day at dawn, noon, and dusk), agnihotram etc.
  2. Naimittika karmas: karmas that are to be done when special conditions are met. For example, the performance of Japa and Tarpaṇam (offering of oblations to ancestors) on a new moon day or at the time of an eclipse. Performance of Śrāddham (annual offerings to ancestors) on the anniversary of a parent, etc.
  3. Kāmya karmas: karmas for certain desired ends such as long life, health, wealth, begetting a son, attainment of svarga, etc.
  4. Prāyaścitta karmas: karmas to be done to atone for a transgression of one’s dharma.
  5. Niṣiddha karmas: prohibited actions not in keeping with dharma that should be avoided entirely.

For those desirous of artha, kāma, and dharma goals in this life and future lives, the Veda helps them by revealing kāmya karmas that can help them achieve those ends. For the kāmya karmas to be efficacious, one is asked to perform nitya and naimittika karmas compulsorily. One is also asked to avoid niṣiddha karmas, and one is asked to perform prāyaścitta karmas in case of transgression of dharma. 

For those no longer interested in artha, kāma goals and want to grow spiritually, the Veda brings them to karma yoga. The Veda asks them to avoid niṣiddha karmas altogether. Then prāyaścitta karmas become redundant. One is asked to give up kāmya karmas completely, for they are meant for artha, kāma goals. One is then asked to perform only nitya and naimittika karmas (which include the Pañca Mahā Yajñas or worship of īswara, contributions to ancestors, sages, fellow human beings and other creatures and the environment around us) as niṣkāma karma. The Veda tells us that when these karmas are done as niṣkāma karma, they provide chitta śuddhi, which hastens one’s spiritual progress.

Even Vedānta doesn’t dismiss the Veda Pūrva when it comes to the means and ends for artha, kāma, and dharma puruṣārthas suggested therein20.  How the karmas work, no one knows, for the chain of causes and effects that make it work are outside the range of laukika pramāṇas. But to one who sees the Veda as a pramāṇa, he knows that they will work if they are done right and with śraddhā. Vedānta doesn’t dismiss the potency of such karmas with regards to their capability to achieve the desired end; it just warns us that the karmas will only produce limited ends in the first three puruṣārthas that will never lead one to mokṣa, limitlessness. What, then, does the Veda have to offer for mokṣa puruṣārtha?

Vedānta

When it comes to mokṣa, Vedānta presents itself as the pramāṇam for Brahman. If one wants to know Brahman, one has no choice but to come to Vedānta. 

वेदान्तो नामोपनिषत्प्रमाणम् तदुपकारीणि शारीरकसूत्रादीनि च

vedānto nāmopaniṣatpramāṇam tadupakārīṇi śārīrakasūtrādīni ca  

Vedānta is the (śabda) pramāṇam, the means of knowledge (in the form of words), that are the Upaniṣads as well as the Brahma Sūtras and other supporting texts (that help in the correct expounding of its meaning).                                              

Vedānta Sāra 3

If one exposes oneself to the śabda pramāṇa, if one makes an inquiry into the meanings of the words of Vedānta, and understands what the sentences mean, one will come to know that he who is looking for Brahman is, in fact, identical with Brahman. The knower of Brahman “becomes” Brahman.21

All the laukika śabda pramāṇas of the world will only help one gain knowledge of known objects. It is only the special śabda pramāṇa of Vedānta that explicitly states that the śabdas are meant to gain knowledge of the very subject, the knower. 

Vedānta is the pramāṇa, the means of knowledge of the subject, the Self. As per the third Knowledge Principle, the vision that Vedānta unfolds cannot be confirmed or contradicted by any other pramāṇa. Vedānta stands tall and self-valid in the sphere of Self-Knowledge, and no other pramāṇa can come anywhere close. The only choice that a seeker of Self-knowledge has is to expose oneself to the words of Vedānta, inquire into their meanings, and understand them with the help of a Guru. The Self is already present as the subject. The Self is already experienced. Its real nature of being limitless Brahman is already accomplished; it is just not known as such. If a qualified seeker of knowledge, who has removed all the obstructions, employs the śabdas of Vedānta, being a pramāṇa, as per the First Knowledge Principle, Self-Knowledge will take place.

Conclusion

We have seen step by step with logic that knowledge of the Self is beyond the scope of all laukika pramāṇas22. We have also seen that if the goal is mokṣa, the means is knowledge of the Self, for the cause is Self-Ignorance, which is destroyed only with Self-Knowledge. If the goal is the knowledge of the Self, the means of that knowledge is Vedānta. 

There was a person who was congenitally blind. He suffered a lot as a result of his disability. He chanced upon a doctor who examined his case. The doctor found that his condition was curable with surgery. The doctor then operated on his eyes. After the operation, his eyes were bandaged for a few days. Then, the day came when the patient was ready to open his eyes. The excited doctor went to see him, and he removed his bandage. Then he told the patient: “Open your eyes, and you will see!”. The patient wasn’t entirely convinced that this surgery would have worked. He told the doctor, “First prove to me that I will see. Only then I will open my eyes”. The doctor was not expecting this. He said, “Trust me, just open your eyes, and you will see. I cannot provide any other proof that you will see”. The patient persisted with the demand for proof of his sight. Finally, after much persuasion by the doctor and nurse, the fellow agreed to open his eyes. As soon as he opened his eyes, he saw! He then jumped with joy that he could see! He did not need any proof then. This story illustrates that the eyes have to prove themselves. If you ask for independent proof that the eyes see, no one can provide such proof. The only option is to allow the eyes to prove themselves by opening the eyes! When one sees for oneself the knowledge that one gets by employing the eyes, one will no longer insist on proof.

The same is true of Vedānta. It is similar to an additional set of eyes with which one can see truths one cannot otherwise see. No one can independently prove that the pramāṇa will work, nor can anyone independently prove what it reveals. When I open my eyes, I see, I don’t doubt what I see, and I know what I see is a fact. My eyes prove themselves. Similarly, one needs to allow Vedānta to prove itself by employing Vedānta as a pramāṇa. Then, one will see oneself23 as being limitless. One will then not need proof for what one sees.

FOOTNOTES 

  1. Note that even Self-Knowledge that destroys Self-Ignorance is in the form of a unique vṛtti (modification of the mind) called akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti in which there is no subject-object division. There is a popular misconception that Self-Knowledge happens beyond the mind. Vedānta doesn’t accept this view. ↩︎
  2. Vedānta Paribhāṣā 1.4
    तत्र स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वम् अनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वम् ।
    tatra smṛtivyāvṛttaṃ pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvam
    Here, the nature of such valid knowledge, as excludes recollection, consists in being cognition having for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated. ↩︎
  3. Tarka Saṅgrahaḥ 19
    Nyāya Śāstra defines valid knowledge (pramā) as follows:
    तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थ: । यथा रजते इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैव प्रमेत्युचते ।
    tadvati tatprakārako’nubhavo yathārthaḥ.yathā rajate idaṃ rajatamiti jñānam.saiva prametyucate.
    A valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing attributes which it really possesses eg̣. The apprehension of silver arising in an object where there is silverness. This is also known as valid knowledge of a thing. ↩︎
  4. Here, when we say, “not negated”, it is in the transactional sense before Brahman is known. For after Brahman is known, the reality of everything except Brahman stands negated from an absolute sense. ↩︎
  5. Tarka Saṅgrahaḥ 20
    Nyāya Śāstra defines invalid knowledge (apramā) as follows:
    तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थ: । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैव अप्रमेत्युचते ।
    tadabhāvavati tatprakārako’nubhavo’yathārthaḥ. yathā śuktāvidaṃ rajatamiti jñānam.saiva aprametyucate.
    That is non-valid apprehension in which an object is known as having an attribute it does not have in reality. For example, the apprehension of silver arising in a piece of mother of pearl. This, indeed, is called false cognition. ↩︎
  6. Vedānta Paribhāṣā 1.3
    प्रमाकरणम् प्रमाणम्
    pramākaraṇam pramāṇam
    The unique cause (or instrument or means) for the rise of valid knowledge (pramā) is called pramāṇam. ↩︎
  7. tantram in this context means dependent. We all may be familiar with the word svatantram, which means dependent on oneself or independent. puruṣatantram means dependent on the person (doing the action). vastutantram means dependent on the object (being known).
    ↩︎
  8. Ādi Śaṅkara writes in Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyam 1.1.2. Translation by Swami Gambirananda
    न तु वस्तु ‘एवम् , नैवम्’ ‘अस्ति, नास्ति’ इति वा विकल्प्यते । विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः । न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । किं तर्हि ? वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् । न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् ‘स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषोऽन्यो वा’ इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति । तत्र ‘पुरुषोऽन्यो वा’ इति मिथ्याज्ञानम् । ‘स्थाणुरेव’ इति तत्त्वज्ञानम् , वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम् । तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् ।
    na tu vastu ‘evam, naivam’ ‘asti, nāsti’ iti vā vikalpyate. vikalpanāstu puruṣabuddhyapekṣāḥ. na vastuyāthātmyajñānaṃ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam. kiṃ tarhi? vastutantrameva tat. na hi sthāṇāvekasmin ‘sthāṇurvā, puruṣo’nyo vā’ iti tattvajñānaṃ bhavati. tatra ‘puruṣo’nyo vā’ iti mithyājñānam.‘sthāṇureva’ iti tattvajñānam, vastutantratvāt. evaṃ bhūtavastuviṣayāṇāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ vastutantram. tatraivaṃ sati brahmajñānamapi vastutantrameva, bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt.
    But a thing cannot be judged diversely to be of such a kind and not to be of such a kind, to be existent and non-existent (simultaneously).  Options depend on human notions, whereas the valid knowledge of the true nature of a thing is not dependent on human notions. On what does it depend then? It is dependent on the thing itself. For an awareness of the form, “This is a stump or a man or something else” with regard to the same stump cannot be valid knowledge. In such a case, “This is a man or something else” is erroneous, but “This is a stump to be sure” is valid knowledge; for it corresponds to the thing itself. Thus, the validity of knowledge of an existing thing is determined by the thing itself. This being the position, the knowledge of Brahman also must be determined by the thing itself, since it is concerned with an existing reality. ↩︎
  9. Ādi Śaṅkara distinguishes Knowledge and Action in Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyam 1.1.4. Translation by Swami Gambhirananda
    ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया, न; वैलक्षण्यात् । क्रिया हि नाम सा, यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुषचित्तव्यापाराधीना च, यथा — ‘यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद्वषट्करिष्यन्’(ऐ॰ब्रा॰ ३-१-८) इति, ‘सन्ध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्’ (ऐ. ब्रा. ३-८-१) इति चैवमादिषु । ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसम् , तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम् , पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात् । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम् । अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम् । केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्; न चोदनातन्त्रम् , नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् । तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम् ।
    nanu jñānaṃ nāma mānasī kriyā, na; vailakṣaṇyāt.kriyā hi nāma sā, yatra vastusvarūpanirapekṣaiva codyate, puruṣacittavyāpārādhīnā ca, yathā — ‘yasyai devatāyai havirgṛhītaṃ syāttāṃ manasā dhyāyedvaṣaṭkariṣyan'(ai॰brā॰3-1-8) iti, ‘sandhyāṃ manasā dhyāyet’ (ai. brā. 3-8-1) iti caivamādiṣu.dhyānaṃ cintanaṃ yadyapi mānasam, tathāpi puruṣeṇa kartumakartumanyathā vā kartuṃ śakyam, puruṣatantratvāt.jñānaṃ tu pramāṇajanyam.pramāṇaṃ ca yathābhūtavastuviṣayam.ato jñānaṃ kartumakartumanyathā vā kartumaśakyam.kevalaṃ vastutantrameva tat; na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram.tasmānmānasatve’pi jñānasya mahadvailakṣaṇyam.
    Objection: Is not knowledge a kind of mental action?
    Not so, because there is a difference. An action is in evidence where the injunction about it occurs independently of the nature of the thing concerned, and where it is subject to the activities of the human mind, as for instance, in sentences such as “When the priest (called Hotā) is about to utter (the mantra) vauṣat, he shall meditate mentally on the deity for whom the libation is taken up (by the Adhvaryu).” (Aitareya Brahmaṇa 3.1.8). “One should mentally meditate (on the deity associated with) evening” (ibid). Though meditation, that is but thinking, is a mental action, yet it can be done, not done, or done otherwise by a man; for it is dependent on man. But knowledge arises from its valid means (e.g̣. perception, inference, etc.); and the valid means apprehend the things just as they are. Hence, valid knowledge is not something to be done, not done, or done otherwise, for it is entirely determined by things, and neither by injunctions, nor by man.  Hence, even though knowledge is a mental act, it has a great difference. ↩︎
  10. Vedānta Paribhāṣā 7.1
    एवमुक्तानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवोत्पद्यते ज्ञायते च ।
    evamuktānāṃ pramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ svata evotpadyate jñāyate ca
    Of the pramāṇas thus stated, the validity is intrinsically generated and cognized. ↩︎
  11. Vedānta Paribhāṣā 7.1
    तच्च ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीप्रयोज्यम्, न तु अधिकगुणमपेक्ष्यते
    tacca jñānasāmānyasāmagrīprayojyam, na tu adhikaguṇamapekṣyate 
    And this (validity) is caused by the entire causal complex of cognition in general and does not require an extra excellence. ↩︎
  12. Cognition of invalidity of knowledge cannot directly come from the cognized knowledge itself as the knower can grasp only what the thought presents. Thus, the fact that the thought has presented an object with an attribute (silverness) that the object (shell) doesn’t have in reality is not and cannot be grasped by the knower inherently with the cognition. It has to be detected externally.
    ↩︎
  13. “What is Śraddhā?” Special talk by Swami Paramarthanandaji
    This is an alternate and more accurate definition of śraddhā.
    उपजीव्यप्रमाणस्वतःप्रामाण्यज्ञानम् श्रद्धा
    upajīvyapramāṇasvataḥprāmāṇyajñānam śraddhā
    The knowledge that “a primary means of knowledge has inherent self-validity in its own sphere” is called śraddhā. ↩︎
  14. Vedānta Paribhāṣā 1.10
    तानि प्रमाणानि षट्, प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दार्थापत्त्य्नुपलब्धिभेदात् ।
    tāni pramāṇāni ṣaṭ, pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdārthāpattynupalabdhibhedāt
    These pramāṇas are six, divided into pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), śabda (verbal testimony), arthāpatti(postulation), and anupalabdhi (non-cognition). ↩︎
  15. Tarka Saṅgrahaḥ 5.8
    पर्वतो वह्निमान्, धूमवत्त्वात्, यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान् यथा महानस: ।
    parvato vahnimān, dhūmatvāt, yo yo dhūmavān sa vahnimān yathā mahānasaḥ ↩︎
  16. Vicāra Sāgara Topic 204
    आगामिभोजनम् तृप्तिकारणम्, भोजनत्वात्, पूर्वानुभूतभोजनवत्
    āgāmibhojanam tṛptikāraṇam, bhojanatvāt, pūrvānubhutabhojanavat ↩︎
  17. Even though the inclusion of arthāpatti, anupalabdhi, and upamāna in the list of pramāṇas discussed here may seem academic, they are included to show the thoroughness, seriousness, and honesty of the inquiry into all available valid means of knowledge to not miss out anything significant, for we are trying to determine the valid means of knowledge to gain Self-Knowledge, which is the only means for mokṣa. ↩︎
  18. An analogy: it is similar to how we tune a radio to a particular radio station and hear the radio waves already there. Similarly, the r̥ṣis are said to have the unique ability to receive the Vedas. They are the seers of the Vedas, not the creators of the Vedas. ↩︎
  19. Godel’s incompleteness theorem is an example of reason being used to show the limits of reason. ↩︎
  20. Muṇḍakopaniṣad 1.2.1
    तदेतत् सत्यम् मन्त्रेषु कर्माणि कवयो यान्यपश्यन् तानि त्रेतायाम् बहुधा सन्ततानि 
    tadetat satyam mantreṣu karmāṇi kavayo yānyapaśyan tāni tretāyām bahudhā santatāni
    All the karmas which the sages saw in the Vedas are true. Those rituals are explained in many ways in the Three Vedas. ↩︎
  21. Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.2.9
    यः ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेद सः ब्रह्म एव भवति
    yaḥ ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda saḥ brahma eva bhavati
    Indeed, the person who knows that limitless Brahman becomes Brahman itself. ↩︎
  22. Even though all laukika pramāṇas cannot by themselves lead us to Self-Knowledge, the teaching of Vedānta employs them as secondary means to show that the vision of Vedānta and the laukika pramāṇas do not contradict each other. laukika pramāṇas, such as inference, are also used to convince the student that the vision of Vedānta is self-consistent. ↩︎
  23. Seeing here means knowing without doubts or error. Vedānta encourages questioning to clear one’s doubts. Most doubts will be in the form of conflict that one perceives between knowledge gathered from laukika pramāṇas that seemingly contradicts what Vedānta says. The clarification will make it clear that there is no conflict. ↩︎
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Published by Satyan Chidambaran

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